Tenant Isolation

Each tenant has its own logical instance of every layer, with hard isolation at the database, storage path, and policy boundaries. Cross-tenant access is impossible by construction, not by application-level access control.

Isolation by Layer

Layer	Isolation Mechanism
Raw	Azure Blob paths namespaced by tenantId. Source credentials use AES-256-GCM at the application boundary.
Ledger	Logical partitions in Postgres. All queries forced through tenant scope.
Wiki	Separate graph per tenant. Embeddings indexed within tenant scope only.
Policy	One active policy per tenant. Policy verdicts include tenantId in their signed payload.
Agent	Scope grants are per-tenant. An agent active for tenant A has zero visibility into tenant B.
Audit	Per-tenant hash chains. Per-tenant Merkle trees. Per-tenant anchored roots.
Surfaces	Slack, Teams, and email identities link to RobotMoney actors through tenant-scoped RLS tables.

Encryption Posture

Azure Key Vault secret or BRAIN_SOURCE_CREDENTIAL_KEY
   └── Global AES-256-GCM source-credential key
         └── Encrypted source credentials in Postgres

Property	Detail
Credential key location	Azure Key Vault secret in production when configured, or BRAIN_SOURCE_CREDENTIAL_KEY outside prod.
Algorithm	AES-256-GCM in shared/src/crypto/credential-key-provider.ts.
Scope	One global source-credential key today. Tenant-scoped envelope keys are not implemented.
Compromise blast radius	Tenant isolation relies on RLS, tenant-prefixed storage paths, and policy boundaries, not per-tenant keys.

Customer-Managed KMS

Customer-managed tenant keys are a planned enterprise hardening item, not a shipped capability.

Status	Detail
Current	RobotMoney-managed source-credential encryption key.
Planned	Customer-managed key support for enterprise tenants before launch.

RBAC Across Humans and Agents

Every API call is scoped by tenant, role, and policy. Agents are subjects in the same RBAC graph as humans. There is no special case for agent calls.

Subject (human user OR agent address)
   ↓
Tenant membership (with role)
   ↓
Policy scope (which capabilities, which resources)
   ↓
Action evaluation
   ↓
allow / confirm / reject

Subject Type	Identified By	Authenticated By
Human	User ID	Email and password, or linked wallet
Tenant headless agent	Agent ID	brain_ak_... exchange for a five-minute JWT
Internal agent	Service principal ID	Service credentials
MCP agent	Agent address	SIWX over Base and BrainMCPAgentRegistry scope

Surface Gateway Role

Slack, Teams, and email approval webhooks run in services/surface-gateway, not inside the core API process. The production role is brain_surface_gateway:

Property	Detail
RLS	Enabled and forced on surface tables. The role has no BYPASSRLS.
Writes	surface_* tables and approval rows only.
Reads	Linked surface identities, users, and active policy rows.
No access	No Ledger money-path grants and no execution_outbox grants.
Secrets	Slack, Teams, and email provider credentials stay out of the core API process.

On-Chain Isolation

On-chain commitments are also tenant-isolated.

Contract	How Tenants Are Separated
BrainAuditAnchor	All functions take bytes32 tenantId. Roots and batch indices stored per tenant.
BrainPolicyRegistry	Policy versions stored per tenantId. EIP-712 signatures bind to a specific tenant.
BrainMCPAgentRegistry	Scope grants stored as (tenantId, agent, capability). An agent scoped for tenant A cannot act for tenant B.
BrainSmartAccount	One smart account contract per tenant. Each enforces its tenant's policy via the on-chain verifier.

Cross-tenant access is impossible at the protocol level, not just the application level. There is no "share data with another tenant" code path because there is no code path that accepts a foreign tenantId.

Data Minimisation

RobotMoney ingests only what enabled capabilities require. Revoking a source triggers retention and deletion workflows.

When	What Happens
Source connected	Only the agreed scope of data flows from that source
Source disconnected	New data stops; existing data enters a retention window
Retention window expires	Raw artifacts deleted (Azure Blob lifecycle); Ledger records marked closed; Wiki references redacted
Tenant deletion request	Full tenant erasure across tenant-scoped rows and storage prefixes

What's Next

Security and Compliance

Non-negotiable principles, compliance posture.

Security

Risks and Mitigations

Known risks and how RobotMoney handles them.

Risks and Mitigations